By Muskan Mustaqeem
Afghanistan has a complex political landscape and faces many challenges, including conflict, terrorism, and instability. It has been a source of transregional extremism, and Pakistan has received the worst spill over effect, prompting its intervention in the domestic politics of Afghanistan. Pakistan has had a complex relationship with Afghanistan and its various governments. Besides the border issue (Durand Dispute), further complexity in the relationship stems from Pakistan’s strategic vision of keeping a submissive administration in power. While Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy may have had some successes in instituting a Taliban government in 2022, it has faced a number of significant challenges in recent months that have limited its ability to pursue its interests in Afghanistan. The attack on Pakistan’s high commission signals that there are a variety of factors that are contributing to challenges or difficulties in Pakistan’s Afghanistan strategy.
On Pakistan’s side, there are certain issues that need to be resolved at the earliest possible date. To settle those issues, Pakistan has supported different militant factions against the ruling governments in Afghanistan. Its foremost concern has been the Durand Line and the Pashtun nationals in the disturbed bordering areas. To achieve the settlement, it supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Cold War against a communist leaning government and Soviet occupation forces. However, in the 1990s, political turmoil engulfed Afghanistan, with several tribal militant factions fighting a civil war to control power. In 1994, the emergence of the Taliban somehow provided Pakistan with a strategic hand to counterbalance other extremist groups. Pakistan sought to pursue its strategic interests with a friendly Taliban regime (1996–2001), but the Taliban could only control three-quarters of its territory before it was overthrown by international coalition forces headed by the United States. The western-backed governments limited Pakatan’s pursuit of strategic interests. The governments of Karzai and Ghani established strong ties with Pakistan’s archrival India, therefore pushing it to the periphery of Afghan affairs. While Pakistan strategized on the emboldening of the Taliban to chase out unfriendly governments. Its initiative was to keep supply channels open in terms of both material and hardware for the Taliban’s strategic hand in its fight for survival. Many analysts concluded that it was one of several factors contributing to the deterioration of its relations with Washington.
Nevertheless, the prolonging of the war had an immense spillover effect on the domestic politics of Pakistan, particularly in the bordering tribal regions. The regions did not see considerable integration in Pakistani politics, besides being disadvantaged in economic and developmental terms. The areas of FATA, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have deep tribal structures in which ethnic, traditional cultural, and clannish loyalties shape relationships with the state. The nationalistic identity and culture could not overcome the ethnic-tribal identities; as a result, the areas resisted the state’s attempts at incorporation, resulting in alienation and hostility towards Pakistan. The security situation in these regions deteriorated after September 11, 2001, as a result of the exploitation of anti-establishment sentiment, which resulted in homegrown extremism in the form of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.The group merged its objective of establishing an Islamic state with the Afghan Taliban and fought alongside coalition forces and against the Pakatan State.
Since 2007, the presence of the group has inflicted heavy losses on life and economy, together with human rights abuses in the course of high-handed security operations in these areas, which not only defamed Pakistan internationally by enlisting it in the FATF grey list but also exacerbated separatist sentiment in ethnic groups.
The progress of the conflict in Afghanistan has had a great impact on Pakistan’s policy orientation. In post-2010, it advocated for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, declaring the Taliban’s fight as legitimate including lobbying for its role in conflict resolution. On the other hand, its sustained security operations inflicted heavy losses on the extremist TTP and abridged security lapses that had enabled the group to inflict violence. The policy of mediation between the US and Taliban was in the interest given that it placed Pakistan in the driver’s seat. This position in the conflict resolution served two purposes; one limiting role of India in Afghanistan and second devising the course of future political dispensation in Kabul with optimism that Taliban government will act in its footsteps.
However, the ground reality is turning out differently given that the Taliban is performing autonomously rather than bowing down to Pakistan’s’ strategic needs. With the Taliban realising its priority areas in domestic and foreign policy, it is getting tougher for Pakistan to set the course of Afghan politics. The Taliban’s first priority is to generate domestic legitimacy by uniting various tribal factions, for which recognising the spread of Pashtun nationalism across the border is critical. Therefore, any imposition of a compromise on the Durand dispute would mean losing domestic legitimacy and betraying Pashtun sentiment.
Since the TTP’s revival in 2021, Pakistan has expected the Taliban to play a decisive role in driving the group from its territory. On the contrary, the Taliban is using it for strategic purposes—to avoid discussion on the Durand Line and pressure Pakistan to follow its approach in dealing with the TTP. Despite Pakistan’s unwavering support, the Taliban has strategically favoured mediation on its own terms over fighting methods. This technique puts pressure on Pakistan while giving the appearance that the Taliban is not an aggressor but a mediator. With this strategy, the Taliban sends a signal to Pakistan not to interfere in Afghan domestic issues, effectively separating itself from being pursued as Pakistan’s strategic partner.
Pakistan’s approach of thinking that a right-wing Pashtun next door is all that is needed to dissect ethnic nationalism in disturbed western regions. However, given the Taliban’s support for Pakhtunistan and close ties with the TTP, the ethnic link between the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan has serious implications for Pakistan’s security. Pakistan itself provided the Taliban with leverage by providing it with a seat in negotiations with the TTP, which challenges its territorial integrity. Rather, Pakistan’s TTP policy should be independent, with no leverage granted to the Taliban or TTP. Furthermore, Pakistan’s reliance on the Taliban for the integration of the FATF and Khyber Pakhtunwa regions describes an ethnic bias in decision making. This ethnic bias, which has also been associated with the Taliban and Afghanistan, has obstructed understanding of Afghans and finding solutions. The whopping concern for Pakistan is its failure to thwart Indian influence, made relevant by the Taliban’s invitation to India to train its troops. Therefore, Pakistan’s decades-long goal in Kabul to have a dependent government is gradually dying away. If India takes the call to train the Afghan military and provide other logistical assistance, Afghanistan will become dependent on India, undermining Pakistan’s authority over the Taliban. By expanding its partnerships beyond Pakistan, the Taliban is attempting to avoid becoming embroiled in a conflict that has been destabilising the region for decades.
Pushing for military action against the TTP does not seem to be a feasible plan, and for the Taliban, it would be a betrayal of Pashtun sentiment and its longest ally. The Taliban is well aware of the gravity of the situation and would not want any internal danger to arise. This has made it difficult for Pakistan to effectively pursue its goals in Afghanistan, including promoting stability and reconciliation. If Pakistan does not want this scenario to play out, it must implement accommodating policies in troubled areas, such as giving room to ethnic sentiment, accelerating development projects, and initiating open dialogue with people rather than armed groups.
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Muskan Mustaqeem is
Research Scholar at Jamia Millia Islamia.